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Abstract
In this paper, we propose some cryptographic techniques to securely set up a mobile ad-hoc network. The process is
fully self-managed by the nodes, without any trusted party. New nodes can join the network and are able to obtain the
same capabilities as initial nodes; further, each node can obtain a pair of secret/public keys to secure and authenticate
its communication. Two additional features of our system are that it allows to implement threshold operations (signature
or decryption) involving subgroups of nodes in the network and that any subgroup with a small number of nodes (between
2 and 6) can obtain a common secret key without any communication after the set up phase.
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1. Introduction
A mobile ad-hoc network (also known as
MANET) is a self-organized wireless network of
mobile nodes without any ﬁxed infrastructure.
Nodes roam through the network, causing its topol-
ogy to change rapidly and unpredictably over time.
Newnodescanjointhenetwork, whereasatthesame
time other nodes leave it or just fail to connect (tem-
porarily) because they move to a region that is not in
the cover range of the network. Nodes are typically
wireless devices such as PDAs, laptops or cellular
phones. From the very beginning, the use of MAN-
ETs has been appealingfor both military and civilian
applications, specially in the last decade because of
the development of wireless LAN technology.
MANETs are also characterized for being band-
width and energy constrained (nodes are often bat-
tery-powered devices) and are specially prone to the
security threats of eavesdropping, interception,
denial-of-service and routing attacks. Some of these
problems may be solved or mitigated with the use of
cryptographic protocols. In the recent literature
many papers make speciﬁc proposals on how to
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www.elsevier.com/locate/comnetuse well-known cryptographic techniques to secure
MANETs, although the problem is far from being
solved.
As an example of MANET, let us consider mul-
tiplayer computer games. With the increasing
amount of mobile devices, multiplayer computer
games are getting very popular. In such games, the
set of players is changing during the game, the play-
ers can join or leave the game at any time, there are
diﬀerent teams, etc. In some of them, the decision
about player admission or game strategy is taken
only when a certain number of members agree.
Some transmitted information has to be protected
(encrypted) against other players or teams.
1.1. Our contribution
In this paper, we propose how to set up a
MANET with the following properties:
1. the process is as decentralized as possible, i.e. the
nodes themselves manage the whole life of the
MANET;
2. new nodes can join the MANET at any moment,
getting the same capabilities as the initial nodes,
if desired;
3. each node can obtain a secret key/public key pair
to be used in the remaining (possibly long) life of
the MANET, for example to sign or decrypt
messages.
The ﬁrst property is achieved by using secret
sharing techniques. At the end, the MANET will
have a secret key/public key pair (SK,PK) such that
PK is public and each node Ni holds a share [SK]i of
the secret key SK.
The second property comes from the use of sym-
metric bivariate polynomials to allow dynamic sets
of nodes. Speciﬁcally, a new node Nj must contact
other nodes in order to obtain its secret informa-
tion, in particular its share [SK]j.
With respect to the third property, the obtention
of individual secret/public keys, we propose two
possibilities, depending on the kind of scenario
where these keys are going to be used. The ﬁrst
one is the well-known PKI-based scenario: each
node Ni can individually generate its pair (ski,p k i)
of secret/public keys. Then, the node must contact
other nodes, which will jointly compute a valid cer-
tiﬁcate linking the identity of Ni with the public key
pki. An alternative is to consider the identity-based
scenario where the public key pki of each node Ni
can be derived (in a public and eﬃcient way) directly
from its identity Ni. Later, node Ni can obtain the
secret key ski which matches with pki by contacting
some master entity. In our system, the role of this
entity is distributed so that node Ni, after contacting
some other nodes will be able to obtain ski. Our sys-
tem admits some interesting extensions to threshold
cryptography. Suppose the MANET is divided into
diﬀerent subgroups of nodes according to a com-
mon characteristic (for example, members of the
same team in multiplayer computer games). Then
we show how our proposal can be extended to allow
threshold decryption; that is, a message intended for
a certain group SG can be decrypted only if enough
nodes in SG cooperate. To do this, we need an extra
variable to be added to the aforementioned bivari-
ate polynomial. Similar ideas can be used to imple-
ment also threshold signatures on behalf of the
subgroup (the veriﬁer is convinced that a number
of members of SG have cooperated to jointly com-
pute the signature). Furthermore, our proposal
allows to reduce the number of nodes in SG neces-
sary to decrypt if the sender considers that a weaker
level of security is enough for a speciﬁc message.
Finally, we show that groups of up to four mem-
bers in the PKI-scenario and up to six in the iden-
tity-based scenario share a common secret key
without any further communication after the initial-
ization step.
1.2. Related work
One of the main issues when applying cryptogra-
phy to MANETs is how to distribute the role of the
trusted authority among the nodes. Therefore, most
proposals to secure mobile ad-hoc environments
make use of some secret sharing technique to dis-
tribute the key of this trusted entity. The ﬁrst pro-
posal was due to Zhou and Haas [1]. They used
threshold cryptography to distribute the role of
the Certiﬁcation Authority (CA) in a PKI scenario
among a set of selected servers. However, this pro-
posal is not suitable for a purely ad-hoc environ-
ment where those selected nodes may not always
be available. Kong et al. [2] adapted this idea to dis-
tribute trust among all of the nodes. However, their
speciﬁc RSA threshold scheme has been proved to
be insecure [3,4]. Other works [5–7] consider an
identity-based scenario and distribute the role of
the master entity.
All these works, whether in a PKI or an ID-based
scenario, make use of Shamir’s secret sharing
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MANET receive some secret information, but either
they do not obtain the same capabilities as the initial
ones or they do it at the cost of a lot of interaction
among some existing nodes. We overcome this
limitation with the use of other secret sharing tech-
niques (which employ bivariate or trivariate polyno-
mials), as we will see in Section 3.
Bivariate polynomials have already been used in
other works to dynamically allow new nodes joining
the network without the need of any external
trusted party, inspired on the original work of [8].
Some works [9,10] constructed decentralized ﬂexible
dynamic group key distribution schemes by means
of using polynomials in two variables. The goal is
to generate common group secret keys. Saxena
et al. [11] used this technique to establish pairwise
keys in a non-interactive way in a mobile ad-hoc
scenario. We stress that their work focuses on sym-
metric cryptography. A good explanation on the
advantages of bivariate polynomials can be found
in [11].
Other works that consider distributed cryptogra-
phy over MANETs are the threshold signature
schemes of [12–14]. They also make use of secret
sharing techniques, although their approach is dif-
ferent to ours. In the case of [12,13] the shared secret
changes according to the set of nodes that cooperate
to produce a signature, while in the case of [14] a
trusted dealer is necessary in the initialization step.
Finally, a work with similar goals than ours can
be found in [15]. There, the authors propose how to
create a self-organized public key infrastructure in a
mobile ad-hoc network, without any third trusted
party. However, their approach is diﬀerent: authen-
tication is based on chains of certiﬁcates, and a node
A signs a certiﬁcate for another node B only if A
trusts B. In some sense, this approach follows the
same trust-based ideas behind PGP.
1.3. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we explain some cryptographic primitives
which will be used in the design of our scheme. In
Section 3, we describe the diﬀerent phases of our
scheme: initialization phase, aggregation of nodes,
obtention of secret/public keys, and threshold oper-
ations involving subgroups. In Section 4, we discuss
the global security of our scheme, and some possible
extensions for it. Finally, we conclude the work in
Section 5.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Secret sharing schemes
The idea of secret sharing schemes was indepen-
dently introduced by Shamir [16] and Blakley [17].
A secret sharing scheme is a method by means of
which a special ﬁgure, called usually dealer, shares
a secret s among a set P ¼f P1;...;Png of n parties.
Each party Pi is to receive privately from the dealer
a piece of information [s]i (or share) of the secret s.
The shares of those subsets of participants allowed
to recover the secret (also known as authorized sub-
sets) can be used to obtain s by means of a recon-
struction process. The family C   2
P of such
subsets is called access structure. For example, given
a set P of n parties as before, an access structure can
be deﬁned as the family of sets with at least t parties;
this access structure C is known as (t,n)-threshold
access structure.
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [16] realizes (t,n)-
threshold access structures by means of polynomial
interpolation. Let Zq be a ﬁnite ﬁeld with q > n and
let s 2 Zq be the secret. The dealer picks a polyno-
mial P(x) of degree at most t   1, where the con-
stant term of P(x)i ss and all other coeﬃcients are
selected from Zq, uniformly and independently at
random. That is,
PðxÞ¼s þ
X t 1
j¼1
ajx
j:
Every party Pi is publicly associated to a ﬁeld ele-
ment ai. Distinct parties are mapped to distinct ﬁeld
elements. The dealer privately sends to party Pi the
value [s]i = P(ai), for i =1 ,...,n.
Let us see that the scheme realizes a (t,n)-thresh-
old access structure. Without loss of generality, we
can assume that the set of parties willing to recover
the secret s is {P1,...,Pt}. The secret s can be
obtained as
Pt
i¼1ki½s i, where ki ¼
Q
j6¼i
aj
aj ai are the
Lagrange coeﬃcients.
It is proven that any set of less than t parties
obtain no information about s, that is, any secret
is equally probable given their shares.
2.2. Identity-based cryptography from bilinear
pairings
Identity-based cryptography was introduced by
Shamir [18] as an alternative to the traditional
PKI paradigm. The motivation was to get rid of
4940 V. Daza et al. / Computer Networks 51 (2007) 4938–4950the need of digital certiﬁcates, signed by some
trusted certiﬁcation authority, which link the iden-
tity of a user with his public key. Indeed, to avoid
impersonation attacks, one must check the validity
of the corresponding digital certiﬁcate before using
the public key (for encrypting or for verifying a sig-
nature). The infrastructure needed to manage such
certiﬁcates is very costly and this can be especially
problematic in the case of MANETs.
This is no longer a problem in identity-based
cryptography, since now the public key of each user
can be derived, in a public and eﬃcient way, directly
from his identity (e.g. e-mail address, IP address,
etc.). Therefore, the link between identity and public
key is established for free, from the beginning.
Later, the user must contact some master entity in
order to obtain his secret key. The master entity
has his own pair of secret/public keys, and uses
his secret key to compute the secret keys of the
users. The main drawback of this paradigm is that
the master entity knows the secret keys of all the
users.
Most of the identity-based cryptographic
schemes which have been proposed up to now (see
for example [19]) employ bilinear pairings, which
are maps e : G   G ! GT, for groups G (additive)
and GT (multiplicative) of the same prime order q,
with the following properties:
1. Bilinear: e(aP,bQ)=e(P,Q)
ab, for all P;Q 2 G,
a;b 2 Zq.
2. Non-degenerate: eðP;PÞ 6¼ 1GT for all P 2 G.
3. Computable: there exists an eﬃcient algorithm to
compute e(P,Q) for any P;Q 2 G.
2.2.1. Baek and Zheng’s threshold identity-based
decryption scheme
In [20], Baek and Zheng proposed a threshold
decryption scheme, which works in identity-based
scenarios. The idea is to distribute the secret key
SKSG of a group of users SG into shares [SKSG]i
among the users of the group, according to some
threshold t0. Then, the (public) identity IDSG of
the group can be used to encrypt a message m, lead-
ing to a ciphertext C. To decrypt such a ciphertext
and recover the original message m, at least t0 mem-
bers of SG have to cooperate by using their shares of
the secret key. On the other hand, less than t0 dis-
honest users of SG have no information at all about
the plaintext message. The scheme consists of the
following protocols (for simplicity, we describe a
version which does not contain any correctness
checking of the partial decryptions).
2.2.1.1. Setup. An additive group G of prime order q
(generated by some public element P) and a multi-
plicative group GT of the same order are chosen
admitting a bilinear pairing e : G   G ! GT. Three
hash functions H1 : f0;1g
  ! G, H2 : GT !f 0;1g
l
and H3 : G  f 0;1g
l ! G are needed, where l is
the bit-length of the messages to be encrypted.
The master entity has a secret key s 2 Zq which is
chosen at random; the matching master public key
is the element PK ¼ sP 2 G.
2.2.1.2. Key generation. Assume that the group SG
has n users, SG ={ P1,...,Pn}. Let t0 be the decryp-
tion threshold such that 1 6 t0 6 n.I fIDSG is the
public identiﬁer of the group, then the master entity
ﬁrst computes the matching secret key SKSG of the
group as SKSG ¼ sH1ðID SGÞ2G. Then, he picks
R1,...,Rt0 1 at random from G, and deﬁnes the
mapping
RðzÞ¼SKSG þ zR1 þ   þz
t0 1Rt0 1 2 G;
where the variable z takes values in Zq. Each user
Pi 2 SG is (publicly) assigned to a diﬀerent value
zi 2 Zq, and he receives from the master entity his
share ½SKSG i ¼ RðziÞ2G of the secret key SKSG.
2.2.1.3. Encryption. Given a message m 2 {0,1}
l to
be encrypted and addressed to the group SG, the
sender chooses uniformly and at random r 2 Zq.
Then he computes the value j = e(PK,H1(IDSG))
r
and the triple of values U = rP, V = H2(j)   m,
W = rH3(U,V) which deﬁne the resulting ciphertext
C =( U,V,W).
2.2.1.4. Threshold decryption. Given a ciphertext
C =( U,V,W), a member Pi 2 SG of the group can
use his secret share [SKSG]i to compute a partial
decryption, as follows. First of all, he checks if
e(P,W)=e(U,H3(U,V)). If this equality does not
hold, he outputs ‘error’. Otherwise, he computes
ji = e(U,[SKSG]i) and outputs this value as the
secret partial decryption.
Let A be a set of (at least) t0 users of SG that out-
put their partial decryptions fjigPi2A. Let k
A
0i ¼
Q
Pj2A;j6¼i
0 zj
zi zj be the Lagrange coeﬃcients corre-
sponding to this set A of users, for all Pi 2 A. Then
the players in A can recover j as follows:
V. Daza et al. / Computer Networks 51 (2007) 4938–4950 4941Y
Pi2A
j
kA
0i
i ¼
Y
Pi2A
eðU;½SKSG iÞ
kA
0i ¼ eU ;
X
Pi2A
k
A
0i½SKSG i
 !
¼ eU ;
X
Pi2A
k
A
0iRðziÞ
 !
¼ eðU;Rð0ÞÞ ¼ eðU;SKSGÞ
¼ eðrP;sH1ðIDSGÞÞ ¼ eðsP;H1ðIDSGÞÞ
r
¼ eðPK;H1ðIDSGÞÞ
r ¼ j:
After that, the original message m is obtained as
m = V   H2(j).
3. Our proposal
In this section, we design a method to set up a
MANET. In our protocol the process is fully decen-
tralized: the nodes themselves manage the whole life
of the MANET, without any trusted third party. At
any time, the new nodes joining the MANET are
able to obtain the same capabilities as the initial
ones after contacting only some nodes. Finally,
each node can get a secret key/public key pair to
be used in the remaining (possibly long) life of the
MANET.
Furthermore, our system can be extended to
implement threshold cryptography, namely both
decryption and signature involving subgroups of
nodes. We focus on the threshold decryption opera-
tion. The threshold signature case results from
applying our techniques to the work in [21]. After
explaining each phase of our scheme, we measure
its eﬃciency in terms of computational and commu-
nication costs for the involved nodes.
We stress that our scheme requires at some stages
authenticated and secret communication between
pairs of nodes. If the involved nodes already have
their pairs of secret/public keys, then they can
employ well-known techniques (signature, encryp-
tion) from public-key cryptography. If not, they
have to execute some protocol by means of which
they authenticate each other and they obtain a com-
mon secret key to be used with some symmetric
cryptosystem. Papers in the literature oﬀer diﬀerent
possibilities for this task; we summarize some of
these approaches:
• Some works [22–24] propose to run ﬁrst a pre-
authentication phase between each pair of nodes,
byusingsomesidechannel.Inthisphasethenodes
can agree on some short password, for example,
which can be used later as the common (and
authenticated) secret input for another key agree-
ment protocol. Examples of such side channels
can be a physical meeting, sending a postcard, a
telephone call, or infrared communication.
• A similar approach is followed in [25], where two
new ways of obtaining mutual authentication by
means of some radio-channel techniques (such as
distance-bounding and integrity-codes) are pro-
posed. This work focuses on making key-agree-
ment more user-friendly, for instance for the
ﬁrst protocol to be secure, it is enough that users
visually verify that there are no other devices in
some integrity region around them.
• Other works propose other ways to authenticate
a key agreement protocol. For example, in [26]
nodes can use some physical procedure to prove
their identity; however, the solution is valid only
for static networks. For this reason, this tech-
nique might be applied, in our scheme, only for
the initialization phase, if we assume that the ini-
tial set of nodes are static during this phase.
Summing up, the problem of creating a secret
and authenticated channel between any pair of
nodes (without any trusted party, in particular with-
out digital certiﬁcates) is not trivial at all, and solu-
tions are costly and onerous. Note that many works
which propose cryptographic solutions for MAN-
ETs assume at some point the existence of such
channels, without discussing the costs/diﬃculties
of implementing them.
3.1. Initialization phase
We denote as N the initial set of ‘nodes in the
MANET; we also refer to these initial nodes as
the founding nodes of the MANET. They jointly
run the protocol described below. There are some
parameters which are public: an additive group G
of prime order q, generated by some element P,
where we assume that the discrete logarithm prob-
lem (i.e., computing the integer s from the value
sP) is hard. Depending on the scenario, we will need
an admissible bilinear pairing e : G   G ! GT. Two
collision-resistant hash functions h : f0;1g
  ! Zq
and H : f0;1g
  ! G are also chosen and made pub-
lic. Finally, the values of the two thresholds t, t0 are
set. Threshold t determines the security level desired
for the MANET, that is, we will assume that at
most t   1 nodes can be dishonest. Threshold t0 is
chosen according to the desired security for the pos-
sible threshold operations involving subgroups of
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security is t0 6 t 6 ‘.
We note that the admissible bilinear pairing e
and the hash function H are necessary only when
identity-based individual keys want to be generated
or when threshold operations involving subgroups
of nodes want to be allowed. Threshold t0 is also
only needed if we want to allow threshold opera-
tions involving subgroups of nodes.
The initialization protocol is as follows:
1. Each node Ni 2 N chooses a random trivariate
polynomial F iðx;y;zÞ2Zq½x;y;z , with degree at
most t   1 in the variables x and y, degree at most
t0   1 in the variable z, and symmetric with
respect to variables x and y. Implicitly, these
polynomials deﬁne a polynomial Fðx;y;zÞ¼ P
Ni2NF iðx;y;zÞ with the same aforementioned
properties as each of the polynomials Fi. Let us
denote as fi,0 = Fi(0,0,0) the constant term of
polynomial Fi(x,y,z), and as s ¼
P
Ni2Nfi;0 ¼
Fð0;0;0Þ the constant term of polynomial
F(x,y,z).
2. Each node Ni 2 N secretly sends to each of the
other founding nodes Nj 2 N the bivariate poly-
nomial Fij(x,z)=Fi(x,h(Nj),z). Furthermore,
node Ni includes the value Yi = fi,0P in each of
these messages.
3. When the previous step is completed by each
node in N, each founding node Nj 2 N can
compute its ﬁnal secret information, which is
the bivariate polynomial
Sjðx;zÞ¼
X
Ni2N
F ijðx;zÞ¼
X
Ni2N
F iðx;hðNjÞ;zÞ
¼ Fðx;hðNjÞ;zÞ:
From the information received from the rest of
founding nodes, each node can compute and
make public the public key of the MANET, which
will be
PK ¼ sP ¼
X
Ni2N
fi;0P ¼
X
Ni2N
Y i:
Note that the (implicit) matching secret key is
SK = s = F(0,0,0). Each founding node Nj can
compute from its partial information Sj(x,z) a share
[s]j = Sj(0,0) = F(0,h(Nj),0) of the secret key
SK = s, corresponding to a Shamir threshold secret
sharing scheme deﬁned by the t-degree polynomial
f(y)=F(0,y,0).
Note also that a necessary condition to securely
run this initialization phase is t 6 ‘; otherwise, if
all the founding nodes were dishonest, they could
obtain all the secret information of the system.
3.1.1. Commitments and veriﬁability
For simplicity, we have not described the most
complete and secure scenario for the protocol
above, where each founding node Ni broadcasts
commitments to the coeﬃcients of its polynomial
F iðx;y;zÞ2Zq½x;y;z . Namely, if b
ðiÞ
mnj is the coeﬃ-
cient multiplying x
my
nz
j in Fi(x,y,z), then the node
makes public the commitment C
ðiÞ
mnj ¼ b
ðiÞ
mnjP 2 G.
These commitments can be stored in some public
database (or included in every message that nodes
broadcast or exchange), and are used to verify if
the secret information Fij(x,z) that node Ni sends
to other nodes is actually consistent, following the
same ideas as in veriﬁable secret sharing schemes
[27,28]. In this way, dishonest nodes can be rejected.
Furthermore, the use of these commitments pro-
vides the system with some interesting extra fea-
tures, as we will explain in Sections 3.4.1 and 4.
Note that, given the commitments C
ðiÞ
mnj for a
given triple (m,n,j), from all the founding nodes,
then Cmnj ¼
P
Ni2NC
ðiÞ
mnj is the commitment to the
coeﬃcient of the monomial x
my
nz
j in F(x,y,z). In
a similar way, commitments Cj to the coeﬃcients
of the t0-degree polynomials F(0,0,z) can be derived
from the initial commitments.
In real implementations of the system, one may
require the commitments and the public key PK of
the MANET to be signed with the secret key SK
which corresponds to PK. In our system, these sig-
natures could be computed by any t nodes, by
means of a threshold signature scheme: each node
uses its share of SK to generate a partial signature;
then, t partial signatures can be combined to obtain
a standard valid signature. The idea of threshold
signatures will appear again in Sections 3.3 and 3.4.
3.1.2. Eﬃciency
Each node Ni sends t Æ t0 values in Zq to each
other node Nj. At the end of this phase, each node
Nj has to secretly store also t Æ t0 values in Zq.
Cost of the operations is low if commitments are
not used. However, if commitments are used, each
node has to compute t0  
tðtþ1Þ
2 modular exponentia-
tions to compute the commitments (since the poly-
nomial is symmetric in the ﬁrst two variables we
do not need to commit to all t
2 Æ t0 values). In this
case, each veriﬁcation, by Nj, of the consistency of
the received secret information, from Ni, with
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tðtþ1Þ
2
modular exponentiations. We emphasize that the
third variable is only necessary if we want to allow
threshold group cryptography. If this is not the case
these calculations are still valid taking t0 =1 .
3.2. Node aggregation
Suppose a new node Nm wants to join the
MANET after the initialization phase is executed.
In order to become a full member of the MANET,
with the same capabilities as a founding node, it
must run the following protocol:
1. Nm selects a group Nm of at least t existing nodes
with whom Nm is able to connect. It identiﬁes
itself as Nm and requests the nodes in Nm to
include it in the MANET.
2. If a node Nj 2 Nm accepts to include node Nm in
the MANET, it secretly sends to Nm the
polynomial
SjðhðNmÞ;zÞ¼FðhðNmÞ;hðNjÞ;zÞ
¼ FðhðNjÞ;hðNmÞ;zÞ¼SmðhðNjÞ;zÞ:
Note that here we have used the symmetry of the
polynomial F(x,y,z) with respect to the two ﬁrst
variables.
3. When node Nm receives this information from t
diﬀerent nodes (for simplicity, we will assume
that the group Nm contains exactly t nodes and
that all of them accept to include Nm in the
MANET), it can obtain its secret polynomial
Sm(x,z) by using Lagrange interpolation:
X
Nj2Nm
Y
Ni2Nm;i6¼j
x hðNiÞ
hðNjÞ hðNiÞ
SjðhðNmÞ;zÞ
¼
X
Nj2Nm
Y
Ni2Nm;i6¼j
x hðNiÞ
hðNjÞ hðNiÞ
FðhðNjÞ;hðNmÞ;zÞ
¼ Fðx;hðNmÞ;zÞ¼Smðx;zÞ:
4. Finally, node Nm can compute its share [s]m =
Sm(0,0) of the MANET’s secret key SK = s.
If commitments are being used in the system
from the initialization phase, node Nj can include
the commitments Cmnj to the polynomial F(x,y,z)
in the information that it sends to Nm (step 2
above). In this way, node Nm could check that
the received information is consistent (also with
the information received from other nodes). If this
is not the case, node Nm should contact another
node.
3.2.1. Eﬃciency
A new node Nm must communicate with t full
nodes and receive t0 values in Zq from each of them.
Again, the operations are not too expensive if com-
mitments are not used, since Lagrange interpolation
can be done quite eﬃciently. If commitments are
used, we are almost in the same case as in the previ-
ous section: the sponsoring nodes must include
commitments to t0  
tðtþ1Þ
2 values in the message and
the new node must perform t0  
tðtþ1Þ
2 modular expon-
entiations to verify the consistency of the informa-
tion obtained from each sponsoring node.
3.3. Obtention of individual secret keys
We consider two possibilities for the obtention of
individual secret keys, depending on whether nodes
want to use PKI-based keys or identity-based keys.
Note that the goal is to provide each node with a
pair of secret/public keys, to be used in the long life
of the MANET for signing/decrypting. The main
advantage of using PKIs with respect to using sym-
metric cryptosystems is that each node has to store
only one secret key, and not one common secret key
for any other node.
3.3.1. PKI scenarios
Each node Nm can individually generate a pair
(skm,pkm) of secret/public keys for some public
key cryptosystem or signature scheme, like RSA.
This will allow node Nm to use signature and
decryption techniques in order to make its commu-
nications secure, from this moment on. However,
to avoid typical impersonation attacks, it is
required that some authority certiﬁes that the secret
key skm which matches with the public key pkm is
actually known by the node Nm. In our system,
the role of this authority is shared among the
nodes. They will produce a certiﬁcate linking pkm
with Nm, which in fact is a signature on the mes-
sage Nmkpkm, valid under the MANET’s public
key PK.
To do this, the nodes can use any threshold sig-
nature scheme. In such a scheme, each node Ni
holding a share [s]i of the MANET’s secret key
can compute a partial signature on the message
Nmkpkm, by using this secret share, after being con-
tacted by Nm. If the threshold signature scheme is
non-interactive, this can be done without interacting
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required to prove that it is really Nm and that it
knows the secret key skm matching with the public
key pkm. Once t nodes have computed the partial
signatures and given them to the requesting node
Nm, this node can combine them to obtain a stan-
dard signature on the message Nmkpkm, valid under
the public key PK. Note here that if node Nm has
already become a full member of the MANET, it
already knows its secret information Sm(x,z), in
particular the share [s]m, and so it must obtain only
t   1 valid partial signatures, because it can com-
pute one partial signature by itself.
The ﬁnal signature (or digital certiﬁcate) can be
employed along with (skm,pkm), as usual in PKI-
based cryptographic scenarios.
Using a non-interactive threshold signature
scheme may be a more suitable option for the
MANET setting, given the possible energy con-
straints on the nodes and the transmission cost.
Taking into account that in our framework the
nodes have shares [s]i of a secret key SK = s such
that the public key is PK = sP, we recommend to
use the non-interactive threshold signature scheme
proposed in [29], which perfectly ﬁts in with this sce-
nario. See [30] for other recent proposals of non-
interactive threshold signature schemes.
3.3.2. Identity-based scenarios
The generation of the individual secret/public
keys for the nodes is diﬀerent in this second sce-
nario, with respect to the ﬁrst one where each node
generated its pair of keys on its own. Now the
public key of each node Nm is directly inferred from
its identity, namely pkm ¼ HðNmÞ2G, where
H : f0;1g
  ! G is the hash function chosen in the
initialization phase. The secret key matching with
this public key is skm = s Æ pkm = sH(Nm), where s
is the master secret key (also denoted as SK here).
In identity-based systems with a centralized master
entity, the node’s secret key would be obtained by
contacting the master entity. In our decentralized
and self-managed system, the role of the master
entity is distributed among the nodes themselves.
Therefore, the node Nm will have to contact some
nodes in order to obtain enough information to
compute its identity-based secret key skm = sH(Nm).
The details of this protocol are as follows:
1. Nm contacts a group ^ Nm of at least t full nodes.
It identiﬁes itself as Nm and requests shares of its
secret key.
2. If a node Nj 2 ^ Nm accepts the identiﬁcation, it
secretly sends to Nm the value
rjm ¼ Sjð0;0ÞHðNmÞ¼Fð0;hðNjÞ;0ÞHðNmÞ2 G:
3. Nm needs to receive t diﬀerent such values rjm
(note that if node Nm is already a full member
of the MANET, it can obtain one of these values
for free by using its own secret polynomial
Sm(x,z)). To simplify the notation, suppose that
^ Nm contains exactly t nodes and that all of them
have sent the corresponding values rjm to Nm.
Then this node can use Lagrange interpolation
(with respect to the second variable of the poly-
nomial F(x,y,z)) to obtain its secret key:
skm ¼ Fð0;0;0ÞHðNmÞ¼sHðNmÞ2 G:
3.3.3. Eﬃciency
In the PKI case, a node Nm must obtain a partial
signature from t other nodes. The cost will depend
of the particular scheme being used. In particular
the scheme of [29] is quite eﬃcient, requiring only
an evaluation of a hash function and a modular
exponentiation. In the ID-based case, node Nm must
also contact t nodes which will send him an element
of the group G (typically a rational point on an
elliptic curve).
3.4. Threshold operations involving subgroups
As we have already said in Section 3.1, each node
Nj holds a share [s]j = F(0,h(Nj),0) of the secret key
SK = s of the system, corresponding to a Shamir
secret sharing scheme with threshold t. Therefore,
nodes can use their shares to perform some opera-
tions (signature and decryption), in such a way that
the cooperation of at least t nodes is necessary to
successfully complete the operation. An example is
the threshold signature on the digital certiﬁcate
which links a node Nm with his PKI-based public
key pkm, as we have just seen.
However, our system also allows threshold opera-
tions(signatureordecryption)concerningonlyasub-
group of (possibly less than t) nodes in the MANET;
thisisactuallythereasonwhyweintroducedthethird
variable z in the polynomials. We will concentrate in
the case of threshold decryption, following the
scheme due to Baek and Zheng sketched in Section
2.2.1. The same ideas can be used for identity-based
threshold signatures, using the scheme in [21].
In our MANET scenario, assume that a node
uses this scheme to encrypt a message for a
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same team in a multiplayer computer game) in such
a way that decryption is possible only if t0 nodes of
this subgroup cooperate. Now a member Nm 2 SG
willing to decrypt the message can run the follow-
ing protocol to obtain its share of the secret key
SKSG:
1. Nm contacts a group ~ Nm of at least t full nodes
(maybe including itself, if it is already a full mem-
ber of the MANET; for simplicity, we will
assume that the group ~ Nm contains exactly t
members and that the process is run successfully
with all of them).
2. Nm identiﬁes itself as a member of the subgroup
SG and requests its share of SG’s secret key.
3. If a node Nj 2 ~ Nm accepts the identiﬁcation, it
secretly sends to Nm the value
sjm ¼ Sjð0;hðNmÞÞHðIDSGÞ
¼ Fð0;hðNjÞ;hðNmÞÞHðIDSGÞ2 G:
4. Once Nm has received t diﬀerent such values
fsjmgNj2 ~ Nm, this node can use Lagrange interpo-
lation (with respect to the second variable of
the polynomial F(x,y,z)) to obtain its share
½SKSG m ¼ Fð0;0;hðNmÞÞHðIDSGÞ2 G:
The only thing we must prove now is that the
shares [SKSG]m of the secret key obtained in this
way follow exactly the same distribution as in the
sharing process of [20,21] depicted in Section 2.2.1.
Indeed, as a result of the initialization phase, we
have
Fð0;0;zÞ¼s þ a1z þ   þat0 1z
t0 1;
for some values ai 2 Zq, for i =1 ,...,t0   1. Now we
can deﬁne the mapping RðzÞ¼Fð0;0;zÞHðID SGÞ2
G, which has all the required properties: (1)
R(0) = sH(IDSG)=S K SG; (2) the rest of terms are
random elements in G, namely Ri = aiH(IDSG) for
i =1 ,...,t0   1; (3) and ﬁnally, the share of SKSG
corresponding to a node Nm 2 SG is [SKSG]m =
F(0,0,h(Nm))H(IDSG)=R(h(Nm)) = R(zm), as in
the original sharing procedure, taking zm = h(Nm)
for the diﬀerent values assigned to the members of
SG.
Therefore, the nodes Nm 2 SG can use their
shares of the secret key to jointly decrypt messages
addressed to SG, or to jointly compute threshold
signatures on behalf of this subgroup SG, by using
the schemes in [20,21]. Note that the condition t0 6 t
is required because, if t < t0, then t nodes could
decrypt any ciphertext addressed to SG (in fact t
nodes are enough to recover the implicit master
secret key s and so break all the security of the
system), contradicting in this way the required
security property of threshold decryption
schemes. This should not be a problem in practice,
because the threshold t which protects the whole
security of the system should be chosen large
enough.
3.4.1. Decreasing the threshold t0
As explained in Section 3.1, the commitments
corresponding to the polynomial F(0,0,z)=
s+a1z +    + at0 1z
t0 1, i.e., the values PK = sP
and Cj = ajP for j =1 ,...,t0   1, can be derived
from the initial commitments C
ðiÞ
mnj. Now assume
that a sender of a message to the group SG thinks
that the threshold t0 is too high, and that a weaker
level of security is enough for the encrypted message
that it wants to send to the group. Suppose that the
desired threshold is in that case t00 satisfying
1 6 t00 < t0. Then, along with the standard ciphertext
C =( U,V,W) corresponding to the Baek–Zheng
scheme described in Section 2.2.1, the sender must
append other values. The idea is that the sender
itself will compute t0   t00 valid partial decryptions
of the ciphertext C, corresponding to some
‘‘dummy’’ nodes (out of SG, for example); in this
way, combining these partial decryptions with t00
new partial decryptions coming from SG will be
enough to recover the message, by using the
Baek–Zheng threshold decryption method.
The only point is how can the sender compute
valid partial decryptions for these t0   t00 dummy
nodes Ni 62 SG. Recall that a correct partial decryp-
tion coming from such a node Ni is ji =
e(U,[SKSG]i), where ½SKSG i ¼ Fð0;0;ziÞHðID SGÞ2
G,i fzi = h(Ni) is the value in Zq publicly assigned
to node Ni. We can write H(IDSG)=aP for some
(unknown) value of a 2 Zq. Then we have
½SKSG i ¼ Fð0;0;ziÞHðID SGÞ¼Fð0;0;ziÞaP
¼ a sP þ zia1P þ   þz
t0 1
i at0 1P
  
¼ a PK þ ziC1 þ ...þ z
t0 1
i CtP0 1
  
:
Now, since the ﬁrst part U of the ciphertext C is
U = rP for some value of r 2 Zq, we can rewrite
the partial decryption corresponding to the dummy
node Ni as
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¼ er P ;a PK þ ziC1 þ   þz
t0 1
i Ct0 1
     
¼ e aP;r PK þ ziC1 þ   þz
t0 1
i Ct0 1
     
¼ eH ðIDSGÞ;r PK þ ziC1 þ   þz
t0 1
i Ct0 1
     
:
And this value can be perfectly computed by the
sender node, which knows all the public commit-
ments and has chosen the value r when it has gener-
ated the standard ciphertext C.
Summing up, if B denotes the employed set of
t0   t00 dummy nodes and C =( U,V,W) is the stan-
dard ciphertext corresponding to Baek–Zheng
scheme with threshold t0, the ﬁnal ciphertext that
the sender must broadcast in this case is C
0 ¼
ðt00;C;fjigNi2BÞ. After that, t00 real nodes Nm of SG
can use their shares [SKSG]m of the secret key of
SG (obtained as described in Section 3.4)t oc o m -
pute their partial decryptions and combine them
with fjigNi2B to recover the encrypted message.
3.4.2. Eﬃciency
A node Nm willing to obtain its share of the sub-
group secret key must do roughly the same opera-
tions as in the previous section for the obtention
of an ID-based key: contact t nodes and obtain an
element of G from each of them, then use Lagrange
interpolation. Further, the threshold group opera-
tions of Baek and Zheng’s scheme require the use
of pairings, which are quite expensive, although a
lot of progress in their implementation has been
made. Decreasing the threshold for group opera-
tions to t00 requires adding t0   t00 components to
the ciphertext and also implies that the sender must
compute t0   t00 pairings.
4. Security and extensions
4.1. Security discussion
In [8], Blundo et al. showed how to use bivariate
polynomials F(x,y) to share a secret and also to set
up a pairwise key agreement in a dynamic group.
The common key of parties i, j was the value
F(i,j) and both the secret sharing scheme and the
key agreement protocol were proven uncondition-
ally secure, that is, it was proven that non-autho-
rized parties obtained no information on the secret
or the shared key. On the other hand, the security
of Baek and Zheng’s threshold decryption scheme
relies on the standard bilinear Diﬃe Hellman
assumption, and the security proof can be found
in [20]. The security of our proposal follows imme-
diately from these two papers.
It is important to stress that, in order to ensure
security of our scheme, a secure and authenticated
channel must be established in the ﬁrst step of the
communication between every pair of nodes. We
have discussed some existing methods to achieve
such a channel at the beginning of Section 3.
4.2. Proactive security
For long-lived MANETs it may become neces-
sary to use proactive secret sharing in order to
‘‘refresh’’ the shares of the secret (but not the
secret). Indeed, the assumption that less than t
nodes are not corrupted for the entire life of the
MANET may be too strong if the MANET has a
long lifetime. In this case, a more reasonable secu-
rity assumption is that not more than t nodes are
simultaneously dishonest in a shorter interval of
time. To deal with such scenarios the notion of pro-
active secret sharing was proposed in [31]. The basic
idea is that, if the lifetime of the MANET is divided
into diﬀerent periods, at the end of each of them a
set of at least t nodes execute the secret sharing
scheme as described in Section 3.1, but for the secret
s = 0. The new shares are now the sum of the old
ones with the new shares of 0. The shared secret is
the same, because the shares of the nodes implicitly
deﬁne a diﬀerent polynomial which takes the same
value at zero.
Note that if we use veriﬁable secret sharing then,
with our scheme, it is possible to sign the commit-
ments to the coeﬃcients of the new polynomial in
a threshold way, ensuring its integrity and authen-
ticity. Thus our scheme can be extended for long-
lived MANETs at a reasonable cost.
4.3. Key agreement
Our system allows every pair of nodes Ni, Nj to
agree on a symmetric key dij ¼ FðhðNiÞ;hðNjÞ;0Þ2
Zq as noted in [8]. Note that if we are in an iden-
tity-based scenario where G admits pairings, then
two nodes Ni, Nj who have already obtained their
secret keys (for example, ski = sH(Ni)) also share
the private information
Kij ¼ eðsHðNiÞ;HðNjÞÞ ¼ eðHðNiÞ;sHðNjÞÞ;
in a non-interactive way. If the identities of the
nodes include some expiry date, since Kij depends
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every period. The same happens to the key dij, but
only if the feature of proactive security is consid-
ered. On the other hand, the security of dij is uncon-
ditional, while the security of Kij is based on
computational assumptions.
If commitments are used when implementing our
scheme, some other group secret keys (for groups of
more than two nodes) can be deﬁned and computed
in a non-interactive way. For example each group of
threeorfournodeswillhaveatleastacommonsecret
key. To see this, just note that each node Ni has a
secret information F(h(Ni),0,0) = [s]i, and shares
with any other node Nj the secret key dij = F(h(Ni),
h(Nj),0). Also note that the values [s]iP and dijP
can be publicly derived from the commitments to
thecoeﬃcientsofthepolynomialF.Therefore,nodes
Ni, Nj, Nk can agree on the key dij[s]kP (or on dik[s]jP,
djk[s]iP, the decision on which of the three keys is
beinguseshouldbedeﬁnedbyaMANETrule).Note
that, in order to compute this key, knowledge either
on dij and [s]kP or on dijP and [s]k is necessary, and
this is only the case for nodes Ni, Nj and Nk. Follow-
ing the same idea, it is clear that a group of four
nodes Ni, Nj, Nk, Nl share the key dijdklP.
When using groups G;GT for which parings
exist, this idea can be extended to groups of up to
six members. As an example, consider the group
of ﬁve nodes Ni, Nj, Nk, Nl, Nm. This group shares,
for example, Kijklm ¼ eðdijP;dklPÞ
½s m. Because of the
bilinear properties of the pairing this is equal to
Kijklm ¼ eðdijP;½s mPÞ
dkl ¼ eðdklP;½s mPÞ
dij. To com-
pute Kijklm, knowledge of one of the integers
dij;dkl;½s m 2 Zq is required, while the inputs of the
pairing, in G, can be publicly derived from the
commitments.
5. Conclusion
When dealing with mobile ad-hoc networks
(MANETs), one usually wants the network to work
without the presence of any trusted third party. A
natural way of achieving this property is by sharing
among the nodes the role that such a third party
would play. For this, an essential tool is the use of
secret sharing techniques. However, the use of stan-
dard secret sharing techniques makes dynamism dif-
ﬁcult to achieve.
In this paper, we present a scheme which over-
comes this limitation with the use of bivariate poly-
nomials. Although these techniques are well known
and proven useful to provide dynamism in admis-
sion control, they had not been used to distribute
the role of a trusted authority in asymmetric cryp-
tography. One of the most important contributions
of this paper is to point out the relevance of these
techniques to this setting.
As a result, we propose a scheme that achieves
decentralization and full dynamism, as well as other
interesting and desirable properties for a MANET:
each node can obtain a pair of secret/public keys
for its own use, threshold operations involving sub-
groups of nodes can be implemented, small groups
of nodes can compute common secret keys, and
the system can enjoy proactive security, which leads
to a long-lived MANET.
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